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THE COMPETENT WARD
Jeremy R. Fitzpatrick*
L Introduction
In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act (also known as the
Dawes Act) in hopes of convincing the American Indian that private
ownership of land is superior to the concept of communal property, because
the government was becoming increasingly dissatisfied with the reservation
policy.' The ultimate goal of the legislation was to assimilate Native
Americans into a colonized lifestyle. Pursuant to the Act, individual tribal
members were allotted parcels of agricultural and grazing land.2 However,
title to these allotted lands was not conveyed in fee simple absolute, but held
in trust for the sole use and benefit of the allottees and their heirs.' While the
role of the Federal government has been transformed over the years, the
United States Secretary of the Interior and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
are ultimately charged with the supervision and management of these "trust"
lands.4 The benefit of these functions depends on whether the BIA properly
performs the services. Although many tribes were more than familiar with an
agrarian lifestyle, the federal government's (through the Bureau of Indian
Affairs) poor management and oversight of the development of these lands has
offered little benefit and greatly diminished tribal culture.'
Moreover, the trust relationship is often difficult to characterize, as the role
of the federal government is intended "only to prevent improvident alienation
of the allotted lands and assure their immunity from state taxation." 6 This
note measures the extent of the federal government's role in managing the
resources held in "trust" and tracks the changing government rhetoric
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
2. 25 U.S.C. § 348 (2000).
3. Id.
4. See Paul E. Frye, "A Travesty of a Mockery of a Sham": The Federal Trust Duty and
Indian Self-Determination, in SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT &
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN INDIAN COUNTRY, Paper No. 2-B, at 2B-27 to 2B-29 (Rocky
Mtn. Mineral L. Found. 1999).
5. John Fredericks Ill, Indian Lands: Financing Indian Agriculture: Mortgaged Indian
Lands and the Federal Trust Responsibility, 14 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 105 (1989).
6. Id. at 105-06; see also Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native
Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471, 1495 (1994).
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regarding Indian policy. Furthermore, this note will discuss the primary
reasons for the relationship's failure and suggest methods by which the
relationship can be improved.
First, this note discusses many of the events and policies that constitute the
background and transformation of the federal government's Indian policy.
Second, reasons for the needed change in the current relationship between the
federal government and Native Americans are suggested. Finally, I conclude
that no reasonable person can be satisfied with the relationship between
Native Americans and the federal government, as it exists today. Because the
current relationship has proven to be extremely inefficient and beneficial to
neither party, I assert that it is time for Native Americans to manage their own
affairs regarding their land and resources currently held in trust.
II. Background
A. Defining the Federal Role
"Federal power over Native Americans derives from a combination of
legislative enactments and judicial decisions, which remain at the core of
contemporary federal policy.7"' Chief Justice John Marshall and the United
States Supreme Court began defining this relationship between the federal
government and the tribes beginning in 1823, with the opinion in Johnson v.
McIntosh, by applying a finder's law analysis to the discovering Europeans
claim of title against all other Europeans.8 Thus, the court concluded that the
discovering Europeans had the sole right of acquiring the soil from the
natives.9 Additionally, Marshall indicated that the Indians' right of occupancy
could be terminated by the European sovereign by "purchase or conquest."'"
Later, in 1831, Marshall handed down another landmark opinion in
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, which described the tribes as "domestic
dependent nations" rather than a "foreign state" within the meaning of Article
III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution, the provision that defines
federal judicial power." Marshall decided that the tribe was a "state," but was
not considered a "foreign" state.' 2 He further characterized the tribes as being
7. See Elizabeth A. Pearce, Self-Determination for Native Americans: Land Rights and
the Utility of Domestic and International Law, 22 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 361,366 (1991).
8. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
9. Id. at 573.
10. Id. at 587.
11. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 15-17 (1831).
12. Id.
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"in a state of pupilage" before defining the relationship as one of guardian and
ward. 3 Thus, the court denied the Cherokees' request for an injunction
against the enforcement of a Georgia statute that extended laws of Georgia
over Cherokee land and abolished the laws of the Cherokee Nation. Although
Marshall sympathized with the tribe, the court refused to hear the case.
Only one year later, in Worcester v. Georgia, a third Marshall opinion was
published that described the several Indian nations as "distinct political
communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is
exclusive," and excluded the states from power over Indian affairs within
those boundaries.' 4
Thus, the trust doctrine has developed on the premise that the tribes were
incompetent and unable to manage their affairs with respect to property
ownership. Today, most Indian lands (both tribal and allotted lands) are still
held in trust by the Federal government for benefit of the tribe or allottee.1
5
Consequently, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the United States
Department of Interior is charged with the management function of the trust
responsibility. In large part, the BIA supervises and approves or disapproves
land and resource development and uses on Indian lands.
In the early 1980s, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
relationship with regard to alleged breaches of trust by the BIA relating to the
management (mismanagement) of timber resources on allotted lands. In these
cases, known as Mitchell I and Mitchell II, the plaintiffs argued that the
United States had breached its fiduciary duty under the General Allotment
Act, and was liable to the individuals for monetary damages. 6 However, the
Supreme Court found the General Allotment Act did not impose a fiduciary
duty, but rather a limited trust relationship "only for the purpose of preventing
improvident alienation and assuring immunity from state taxation."' 7 The
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims remand holding
that the individual plaintiffs could recover damages pursuant to a source other
than the General Allotment Act, there, the Tucker Act. 8 The BIA's daily
supervision of the harvesting and management processes led the court to
establish a relationship under which a fiduciary obligation is owed, because
13. Id. at 17.
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557-61 (1832).
15. See Wood, supra note 6, at 1478.
16. United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980); United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206
(1983).
17. Fredericks, supra note 5, at 109.
18. Id.; see also Mitchell v. United States, 664 F.2d 265, 267-68 (Ct. Cl. 1981); Mitchell,
463 U.S. at 222-25.
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the common law trust requirements had been met (e.g., a trustee (United
States), a beneficiary (allottees), and a trust corpus (timber lands and
resources)).1 9
B. Self-Determination
Beginning in the 1960s, the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches
of the federal government each recognized, at least to some extent, the rights
of self-determination with respect to Indian affairs. However, some argue that
any grant of self-determination had been limited to "discrete spheres," and that
each branch of the government has violated the federal trust responsibility
throughout history."0
Presidents John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and Richard Nixon each
.made policy statements, which favored Indian self-determination. Also,
President Ronald Reagan rhetorically supported self-determination while
making a major policy statement in 1983 that reinforced the Trust obligation.
In fact, the Reagan Administration tried to abolish compensation being paid
to Indians in claims involving land disputes. Native American advocates were
quick to highlight this type of rhetoric by pointing to the fact that the
"administration aggressively sought" to unilaterally revoke the funds, a move
which would directly impede self-determination."
In 1975, Congress passed the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, which would allow an Indian tribe (by tribal resolution) to
contract with the Secretary of the Interior to perform functions within the
organization currently performed by the BIA.22 Language of the Act supports
the Trust doctrine and the policy of self-determination simultaneously:
"Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the
Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with,
and responsibility to, individual Indian tribes and to the Indian
people as a whole through the establishment of a meaningful
Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly
transition from the Federal domination of programs for, and
services to, Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the
19. Fredericks, supra note 5, at 109-10; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2
cmt. h (1959).
20. Pearce, supra note 7, at 369.
21. Id. at 370.
22. Id. at 371.
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Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those
programs and services.""
In addition, the argument exists, that because the courts created the Trust
Doctrine, they bear a "special responsibility for upholding it."' 24 Although, the
courts have issued decisions favorable to Indians that effectively enforce the
Trust Doctrine, they have failed to uphold the doctrine for the most part -
"opting instead to defer to congressional prescriptions in matters related to
Indian powers and laws. 25 Policy matters have been largely inconsistent with
federal government action relating to Indian affairs, making it impossible to
deduce a uniform practice with respect to modem issues. The government
was speaking out of both sides of its mouth. That is, while the goal of the
Self-Determination Act was on target, the BIA, having little incentive to aid
Indians in gaining the status, actually thwarted any progress in the interest of
preserving the number of jobs within the agency.
C. The Trust Responsibilities
Native Americans have acquired a unique legal status, and although a
special relationship still exists between the federal government and the Native
Americans, it is difficult to define the scope of the trust doctrine.
Characterized as "fiduciary" in nature, the responsibility may be defined
broadly or narrowly, depending upon the context to which the courts are
speaking. At the broad end, the duties include "maximizing tribal revenues"
and looking out for the "best interests of the tribe. 26 More commonly,
however, the relationship is described as that of trustee and beneficiary, where
the federal government owes some legally enforceable responsibilities to the
tribes and allottees.27
Even still, the BIA has traditionally been involved in all aspects of the
development scheme, including allocating resources, negotiations and
contracting, as well as collecting rents and royalties payable to the tribes or
allottees.25 Ideally, tribes and allottees lacking resources and expertise would
23. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 450a(b) (1988)).
24. Id. at 372.
25. Id. (citing Congress' reductions in territorial sizes of reservation without tribal consent
over the past two decades).
26. See Lynn H. Slade, The Federal Trust Responsibility in a Self Determination Era, in
SPECIAL INSTITUTE ON NATURAL RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT & ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
IN INDIAN COUNTRY, Paper No. 2-A, at 2A-16 (Rocky Mtn. Mineral L. Found. 1999).
27. See id.
28. See Wood, supra note 6, at 1478.
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benefit from the Bureau of Indian Affairs' paternalistic involvement, but
history has told a different story.29 Although the BIA's handling of certain
duties is a valuable service, tribes and individual Indian landowners only
benefit if these services are performed in a timely, efficient, and effective
manner.
30
D. Enforcing Trust Responsibilities: Cobell v. Norton
Perhaps, some of the most telling facts are those underlying the current
Cobell v. Norton class-action lawsuit now pending in U.S. District Court in
Washington, D.C." In Cobell, the class is made up of approximately 500,000
American Indians and their heirs (individual allottees) in an action for
accounting of up to $40 billion.32 The fact is, no one knows how much is
owed, but royalties for grazing, timber and oil and gas operations were lost,
stolen and went uncollected until this suit was filed in 1996. Since 1999, after
much discovery and testimony was had, United States District Judge Royce
Lamberth has held both Secretary of Interior Babbitt and Secretary of Interior
Norton along with Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin in contempt of court for
repeated delays in document production and misrepresentations under oath.33
"As a result of more than a century of malfeasance, the United States
government has no accurate records for hundreds of thousands of the Indian
beneficiaries nor of billions of dollars owed the class of beneficiaries covered
by the lawsuit."' It seems very difficult to argue that the federal government,
as trustee, has not breached its duties owed when it is impossible to account
for past rents and royalties due to the beneficiary. While it is unlikely that the
federal government will ever be able to accurately account for past due
amounts, the Indian plaintiffs should hope for a fair settlement and force the
entire system "to reform in a way that empowers people to make use of their
assets"..."It's not money we're talking about here, but freedom."35
29. Indian Trust: Cobell v. Norton, at http://www.indiantrust.com (last visited Sept. 29,
2003) (case overview).
30. See Slade, supra note 26, at 2A-3 1.
31. Indian Trust: Cobell v. Norton, supra note 29.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Sara Bullard, Broken Trust: A Report from Blackfeet Country, Nov. 4, 2002, at
http://www.indiantrust.com (last visited Oct. 2, 2003) (filed under Media/News Articles).
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Il. Analysis
Non-Indian resources developers are continuously faced with substantial
risks under the trust doctrine. In addition to tribal immunity from suit, tribal
regulations and potential tribal court jurisdiction, a non-Indian developer will
often be troubled by the "potential for one-sided trust duty interpretations and
resulting remedies."36 Moreover, unnecessary restrictions on the conveying
and leasing of land will often inhibit resource development with respect to
allotted land, all the same. The trust doctrine must be transformed in order for
tribes to preserve their culture and provide resources to their members.
Capable individual allottees should enjoy the unbridled right to contract to
develop or alienate their land. "To the degree the trust relationship is properly
characterized as that of guardian and ward, common law principles
contemplate that the guardianship applies 'only when and for so long as the
ward is lacking legal capacity."' 37 Therefore, some mechanism should be
implemented in order to determine whether Native Americans desiring to
manage their affairs are competent and capable of doing so. Moreover,
reasonable standards should be set in order to measure one's capacity.
Although, the guardian-ward analogy does not match all aspects of federal-
tribal relations (e.g., it is the ward and not the guardian who retains title to the
subject property), such a relationship entertains the idea that "the ward will
begin to take responsibility" for its own affairs, at some point.38 Furthermore,
if the relationship is characterized as that of trustee and beneficiary, a change
is still in order. "Where a trust is created for a beneficiary and the purpose of
the trust is to deprive him of management of the property on account of a
legal, physical, or mental disability, and that disability is subsequently
removed, the beneficiary can compel termination of the trust."39 Thus, any
allottee or competent tribe should be allowed to compel termination of the
trust, and competency may be determined on a case-by-case basis. However,
the government should defer to the tribe or individual allottee and offer advice
only when such input is solicited.
36. Slade, supra note 26, at 2A-20.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)OF TRUSTS § 7 cmt. A (1959).
38. Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 21 CI. Ct. 565, 573 (1990).
39. See Slade, supra note 26, at 2A-32 (citing 3 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 337.5, at 2464 (2d ed. 1956)).
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A. Sovereignty and Self-Determination
It may be argued that Native Americans have achieved a greater degree of
self-determination in some areas, but I do not view self-determination or
sovereignty in terms of degrees. I choose to define "sovereignty" and the
closely related term, "self-determination," quite simply, as the freedom to
choose one's own political, economic, cultural and social future. 40 Although
I do not believe this freedom to be absolute, you either have the freedom or
you don't. Of course, I would limit the applicability of the term to those
"possessing a territory, a population, a government, financial and natural
resources, an economy, a culture, a language, and the like.",4' These qualities
must be recognized, both internally and externally, to a substantial degree.
That is, the people must recognize their own sovereignty, and other peoples
must recognize that people's sovereign belief, as well.42 "[T]he greater the
degree of external recognition, the stronger the assertion of sovereignty. 43
The relationship between Native Americans and the federal government
should provide Native Americans, as a group, "political, economic, and socio-
cultural equality with the rest of... society" that allows them to retain their
identity as Indians.' This right of equality should be recognized as inherent,
and not as a concession or privilege from the federal government.45
B. Transforming the Relationship
In order to achieve sovereignty, the relationship cannot go unchanged.
Whether the relationship is abandoned or modified, a change is in order.
Farmers and ranchers are greatly disadvantaged by little access to capital for
tools and improvements needed for trust land development, because trust land
cannot be sold or mortgaged.' Additionally, individual trust lands are often
shared by many individuals due to the inheritance rules for individual trusts,
thus the administrative costs associated with land management are increased
and can make management uneconomical. 47 Research has shown that "trust
40. See Robert B. Porter, The Meaning oflndigenous Nation Sovereignly, 34 ARIZ. ST.L.J.
75, 75 (2002); see also Pearce, supra note 7.
41. Porter, supra note 40, at 102.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Pearce, supra note 7, at 384.
45. Id.
46. See Seth H. Row, Tribal Sovereignty and Economic Development on the Reservation,
4 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 227, 233 (1996).
47. Id.
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lands both individual and tribal produce only about half the value of fee
simple lands on a per acre basis," because the inefficiencies of federal control
are only mimicked.4" By converting trust lands to fee simple ownership by the
tribes or individuals, optimal economic growth can be achieved. One writer
claims that this proposal does not conflict with the cultural integrity of Native
Americans, because there is a long tradition of private property in some Indian
cultures.49 I do not believe that Native Americans have to choose between
economic growth and cultural preservation, but should be afforded that
freedom, nonetheless.
However, it has also been argued that fee simple ownership, while
economically promising, may destroy tribal land bases in the longer term,
because they will be forced to sell or assign development rights associated
with the land in order to function economically. 0 Moreover, if the land base
is destroyed, a critical element underlying the sovereignty argument for Native
Americans will be lost.5 ' This argument is based on the notion that Native
Americans will be forced to choose economic growth over cultural
preservation, and alienate the land and resources in order to provide for their
needs and the needs of their dependents. This notion is evidenced in the case
of Babbitt v. Youpee, where individual Indians and several tribes successfully
challenged Section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act. The Act
provided for "undivided fractional interests in allotted land, passed by devise
or descent, to [escheat] to the tribe if the interest represented less than two
percent of the total acreage in the parcel and earned less than $100 in any of
the five years prior to the date of the decedent's death. ' 52 The plaintiffs in the
Youpee case chose "the economic desirability of individual over tribal land
holdings and [acknowledged] the need for maintenance of the tribal land
base."5 3 Thus, Native Americans have voiced their concerns regarding the
trust relationship involving Indian lands and the almost inevitable loss of land
and sovereignty should the trust relationship be terminated. However, the
trust doctrine, as it exists today, "discourages investment and jeopardizes
economic development," because the federal government is able to invalidate
leases of Indian land that may not be in the best interest of the tribe.54
48. Id. (quoting TERRY L. ANDERSON, SOVEREIGN NATIONS OF RESERVATIONS?: AN
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 126 (1995)).
49. Id. (citing ANDERSON, supra note 48, at 144).
50. Id. at 234.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 228.
No. 1]
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Obviously, this power has ultimately hindered economic development on
Indian lands, as developers fear losing their investment due to reliance on
contracts that can be later voided. Therefore, Native Americans must find a
way to balance the economic interests as sovereign nations with their interests
in protecting their land bases and cultures.55 That is, Native Americans
(individuals and tribes) should have the ability to choose which interests they
wish to compromise, even if they wish to compromise their land base (and
ultimately their sovereignty).56 "Perhaps that is true freedom for a people. 57
The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975
allows the Secretary of Interior to contract with Indian tribal organizations for
the performance of functions normally assigned to the Bureau of Indian
Affairs.58 This is allowed upon request by a tribe pursuant to a tribal
resolution.59
However, Professor Porter writes: "Tribal self-determination is denied
whenever the United States asserts its trust responsibility and imposes its view
of ensuring the well-being of the Indian nations. '6 Porter also describes the
federal trust responsibility as two-faced, as it serves to protect the Indian
nations from "external threats and [regulates] internal affairs."'" The trust
responsibility can be characterized as fully consistent with the treaty-based
conceptions of protection when exercised to shield Native Americans from the
states and other external threats.62 But fundamental rights of "Indigenous self-
determination" are violated when the trust responsibility is exercised to
interfere with internal tribal affairs.63 The BIA's role must be changed
completely. Some believe that the notion that tribes are unable to manage
their affairs with respect to property ownership is slowly being "eclipsed" in
this current era of self-determination, because Native Americans desire the
freedom to control development of their land and resources.' However, Slade
contends that any modification of the trust doctrine must be carefully thought
55. Id.
56. Id. at 236.
57. Id.
58. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988).
59. Id.
60. See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal Indian
Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 950 (1998) (discussing the Federal Trust
Responsibility).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 950-51.
64. See Slade, supra note 26, at 2A-33.
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through, because the doctrine serves as the foundation of the relationship. I
agree, by suggesting that the trust responsibility should be removed, we run
the risk that the federal government may swing the pendulum the other way
and tighten existing restrictions. Even still, I believe this risk is less
substantial than it has been in the past, and the Cobell v. Norton case may
strengthen the suggestion that Native Americans should be free to manage
their own affairs, especially when the federal government has failed
repeatedly to do so. Moreover, the current litigation may present a perfect
opportunity for the Court to step in and modify the relationship
I believe it is time for Native Americans to manage their own affairs
regarding their land and resources currently held in trust. This is precisely
what policymakers wished to achieve with the implementation of the Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975. The legislation
was met with controversy, however, because the previous Indian policy was
Termination. Even still, the Self-Determination Act allowed for the Indian
nations "to assume, under the terms of a negotiated funding contract with the
federal government, a share of the administrative responsibilities and
resources otherwise assumed by the BIA."6 Consequently, the BIA was
charged with determining which contracts would receive funding, and this
ensured that the policies and responsibilities of the federal government would
still be performed by the Indian nations.66  "Policymakers greatly
underestimated how difficult it would be to extricate the BIA from the lives
of Indian people. ''67 This is ultimately why the Self-Determination Act has
been unsuccessful.
Notwithstanding the fact that Native Americans should enjoy the
fundamental right to govern their own affairs, it is extremely expensive and
inefficient for the United States to manage Indian affairs. The federal
government has spent billions of dollars managing and controlling Indian
nations, and it has lost and mismanaged upwards of an estimated $40 billion
in rents and royalties due to individual allottees alone.6" It is difficult to argue
that any party is benefiting from the trust relationship, whether it is the United
States taxpayer, the Native American, or the resource developer. "The current
controversy regarding accounting for trust funds raises the question whether
allottees are better served by the United States' performing these services
without charge than they would have been had the allottees handled the
65. See Porter, supra note 60, at 964.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 965.
68. Bullard, supra note 35.
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accountings at their own expense."69 In fact, it appears that the only people
benefiting are those who hold jobs with the BIA. Moreover, the BIA has
struggled to survive since the Self-Determination Act was passed in 1975.
[The BIA] did not like, and still does not like, the idea that Indian
people can take care of themselves and that they as nations have a
sovereign right to do so. Having been established upon just the
opposite premise - that it is the federal government's exclusive
prerogative and responsibility to manage Indian affairs - the BIA
resisted the implementation of the Self-Determination Act and the
contracting of funds and programs to the Indian nations.
Implementation of the Act was hampered by a large bureaucracy
that had no incentive or desire to facilitate success when faced with
the prospect of losing jobs and power.7"
Therefore, it may be impossible to reconcile the trust doctrine with a self-
determination policy, because the proper incentives are not in place. That is,
as long as the BIA has authority to approve or disapprove certain contracts
relating to the development of Indian lands, Native Americans will be unable
to obtain that freedom. Slade argues, "It would be a folly to do away with the
trust responsibility in a stroke."'" Further, he recognizes (and I agree) that few
tribes and individual mineral owners are ready to assume full responsibility
for their lands and minerals. However, I contend that there are many, many
more non-Indian landowners (and more specifically mineral owners) who are
less capable of managing their affairs, but those people rely primarily on the
courts to ensure good faith and fair dealing with respect to development
contracts. The fact is, the great majority of mineral owners know very little
about the exploration and production industry, but most have enough sense to
seek legal advice before agreeing to a contract.
Moreover, I recognize that Native Americans bear a special relationship to
the federal government and are afforded greater protections in dealings
relating to the land, but the stigma associated with such protections may be
more harmful and serve to oppress Native Americans further into the future.
However, non-Indian developers and creditors will surely look to Indian lands
as a last resort for investment due to the difficult bureaucratic processes
involved in reaching an agreement. More specifically, developers should not
69. See Slade, supra note 26, at 2A-3 1.
70. See Porter, supra note 60, at 965 (citations omitted).
71. See Slade, supra note 26, at 2A-33.
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fear that Indian landowners might misuse the trust doctrine in order to back
out of agreements found to be less favorable than originally thought.
C. Indian Mineral Development Act
Both tribes and individual Indian mineral owners have negotiated
agreements and determined the underlying terms themselves over the past
fifteen years.72 That is, the BIA's role has diminished significantly in more
recent years. The Indian Mineral Development Act (IMDA) has eliminated
many obstacles and offered flexibility in the leasing and contracting stage of
mineral development.73 Pursuant to the Act, tribes are allowed to adopt terms
that reflect each party's interests, because form leases and competitive bidding
are no longer required.74 The IMDA expressly provides that Secretarial
approval may be conditioned only upon compliance with the National
Environmental Policy Act, which requires that an Environmental Assessment
be had prior to development.75 Apparently, it is a rare instance when the BIA
recommends or insists upon more favorable terms. Perhaps, the BIA's role
has been transformed from manager to advisor, where the agency assists
Native Americans in the process when needed and ensures that the requisite
studies are done in compliance with federal regulations. This approach should
be taken with respect to all land transactions, and the Federal government
should defer to the tribes or individual allottees in the decision-making
process.
IV. Conclusion
Colonization began in the late 1800s with the passing of the General
Allotment Act. Suffering tribal economies and poverished living conditions
instigated the change by those friendly to Native Americans. However, the
plan proved to be the most devastating piece of Indian legislation in the
history of the United States. Since then, the Federal government's
relationship to Native Americans has primarily been paternalistic. Chief
Justice John Marshall, perhaps, is more responsible than any other for the
government's assuming this guardianship role, due to his characterization of
the tribes as being "in a state of pupilage.' 76
72. Id. at 2A-30.
73. Id. at 2A-24.
74. id.
75. Id. (stating that NEPA compliance is required before the Secretary may validly approve
a minerals agreement).
76. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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The relationship between the American Indian and the Federal government
has become increasingly difficult to characterize, but may be changing for the
better, as indicated. Although the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975 was intended to give more freedom to desiring tribes
and individual allottees, the BIA was more interested in preserving its jobs
than in loosening its grip on Indians with respect to property ownership. In
recent years, the BIA has taken somewhat of a hands-off approach when it
comes to transactions such as mineral leasing. That is, the agency has
assumed a more support-oriented role rather than its traditional management
responsibilities. The current Cobell litigation presents the court with a unique
opportunity to re-define the responsibilities of the federal government with
respect to Native Americans and their land. This only seems appropriate since
the court defined the relationship in the first place. Moreover, the Executive
branch of the federal government has proven, all too often, that it is unable to
properly manage the corpus of the trust. Native Americans should compel
termination of the trust, and demand that the federal government assume a
supporting role with respect to property ownership. The current relationship
has proven to be extremely inefficient and beneficial to neither party, as the
federal government has spent billions of tax dollars and mismanaged billions
of dollars in rents and royalties due to individual allottees alone.
Any interested person should be uncomfortable with the existing
relationship, and insist that the BIA's role be transformed to that of a support
staff rather than manager. It is time for the Native Americans to manage their
own affairs regarding their land and resources.
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